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Résumé: Cet article développe un modèle principal-agent pour analyser la composition optimale des 
politiques de rémunérations en présence d'incitations monétaires et non monétaires. On 
caractérise les bénéfices non monétaires comme des symboles pour capturer un ensemble 
large de compensations non monétaires telles que les avantages en natures, le statut, l'identité 
ou même les sanctions. Nous montrons que lorsque les préférence des agents sont de 
connaissance commune les incitations non monétaires sont toujours plus efficaces que les 
incitations monétaires. Nous caractérisons également la composition optimale du schéma de 
rémunération lorsque le principal ne connaît qu'imparfaitement les préférences des agents. En 
particulier, nous montrons que des avantages en nature fixes combinés à un salaire variable 
sont plus rentables pour le principal dans ce contexte. 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we develop a Principal-Agent model to analyze the optimal composition of the 
compensation policy with both monetary and nonmonetary incentives. We characterize 
nonmonetary benefits as symbols to capture a large set of non-wage compensations such as 
fringe benefits, status, identity (or self-image) or even sanctions. We show that when the 
agent's preference relation over monetary and nonmonetary benefits is common knowledge to 
both parties, nonmonetary incentives are always more efficient, that is Pareto-dominate, 
monetary incentives. We also characterize the optimal composition of the compensation 
policy when the principal imperfectly knows the agent's preferences. In particular, we show 
that a fixed fringe benefits coupled with a variable wage improves profits under this imperfect 
knowledge structure. 
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THE COMPOSITION OF COMPENSATION POLICY: FROM
CASH TO FRINGE BENEFITS
PATRICIA CRIFO AND MARC-ARTHUR DIAYE
1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the debate on firm’s optimal compensation policy by
focusing on the composition of the pay package in terms of monetary and non-
monetary (fringe) benefits. A firm’s compensation policy can be broken into three
independent dimensions: the level, the functional form and the composition (Baker
et al.[4]). The level of compensation determines the quality and quantity of em-
ployees - that is who the firm can attract, the functional form determines the links
between pay and performance - that is how employees perform once they’re hired,
and the composition defines the relative amounts of the components of the pay
package such as cash, fringe benefits, working conditions, relationships with co-
workers, leisure etc. Most of the existing work on incentives have privileged the
first two dimensions.
It is conventional wisdom in the management and organization literature that
“knowing when to use travel, merchandize or cash to reward employees increases
the odds of a successful incentive ”(Wood [25]). The optimal composition of the
compensation policy hence is a crucial issue in the design of incentives by employers.
However, this issue has been surprisingly left aside of economic analysis until recent
years. Empirical evidence on this topics is also relatively scarce and mostly con-
centrated in the literature on fringe benefits. Fringe benefits vary from one country
to another, but typically include pension scheme, health and life insurance, stock
options, free car, free housing or lower valued fringes like free coffee for instance,
and fringe benefit policies represent a significant component of firms’ compensation
policy. Overall non-wage labor costs would account for 15 to 40 percent of total
labour costs in major OECD countries (Dale-Olsen [6]). Recent studies also aim
at providing empirical estimate of employees preference for non-wage benefits like
health insurance (Royalty [23] and Goldman et al. [13]) or on the consequences of
fringe benefits on labor market indicators such as employment, worker turnover or
firm’s survival and productivity (Dale-Olsen [6] and [5], Hashimoto et al. [16]).
A related literature has investigated the role of perquisites (perks) in executive
compensation, where perks refer to “forms of nonmonetary compensation offered to
select employees ... not strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the employee’s
Date: February 2006.
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duties”(Rajan and Wulf [22]). In the corporate finance literature, perks are often
considered as a way for managers to misappropriate some of the firm’s surplus.
Excessive perks may indeed reflect wasteful corporate practices such as overinvest-
ment and lax management. More generally, as any type of private benefits they
would exemplify agency costs and inefficiencies: “they are attractive to manage-
ment but of no interest to shareholders - in fact they reduce firm value”(Hart [14]).
However, there is no consensus on this explanation of perks as private benefits and
there are alternative theories of why firms might offer perks. They might indeed be
awarded to enhance managerial productivity and/or let the CEO signal his status
and reinforce his standing in the organization.
The idea that nonmonetary variables play an important role in firms’ compen-
sation and employment policy is not new and goes back to Adam Smith (1776).
In Rosen [24]’s theory of compensating differentials, the nonpecuniary components
of a job are transformed into their monetary equivalent to quantify the value of a
job. However, only recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in the study
of the determinants and labor market consequences of non-wage compensations.
This renewed interest stems from arguments and criticisms raised in management
and/or social psychology leading to treat fringe benefits as non-wage job amenities.
Despite their monetary value, fringe benefits would not be equivalent to money
wages for psychological reasons like endowments effects (employees might be more
attached to fringe benefits than the equivalence in money) or framing effects (lead-
ing employees to evaluate fringe benefits differently than cash) (Kahneman et al.
[18]).
In turn, a growing literature has developed the past decade to study work mo-
tivation, in particular building on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation and incentives. Departing from the assumption of purely self-interested
agents, this literature has explored the psychological effects of monetary rewards
on motivation and effort (see Frey [11] and Kreps [19]). The motivation crowding
effect theory relies on the idea that there is a psychological process which underlies
intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives. Monetary rewards may thus reduce
intrinsic motivation: where individuals perceive an external intervention to be con-
trolling, their intrinsic motivation to perform the task diminish (see Deci and Ryan
[8]).
However, as pointed out by Akerlof and Kranton [1], “A source of motivation is
missing from current models of organizations. [We] characterize this missing source
as identity. By identity, we mean a person’s self image - as an individual and as
part of a group. (...) In the Army as well as in civilian organizations, such identifi-
cation - or lack of it - plays a critical role in determination of work effort, incentive
schemes, and organizational design.” By incorporating the psychology of identity
into economic analysis of work incentives, Akerlof and Kranton [1] hence build an-
other bridge between social psychology and economics within recent developments
of agency theory.
Such approaches provide an excellent analysis of psychological motives and their
effect on work motivation and effort within agency relationships. Our ambition is
different: without departing from the assumption of purely self-interested agents,
our goal is to determine the optimal composition of the compensation policy of
a firm in terms of monetary and nonmonetary benefits. We will not explore the
THE COMPOSITION OF COMPENSATION POLICY: FROM CASH TO FRINGE BENEFITS 3
psychological channels through which nonmonetary benefits affect individual moti-
vation, but rather focus on the design of the compensation policy mix as an incentive
device when that agents value both monetary and nonmonetary benefits. As a con-
sequence, we will also characterize the links between both kinds of rewarding tools
in terms of relative complementarity or substitutability.
We consider a moral hazard model in which the transfer between the principal
and the agent is non-purely monetary in the sense that it is composed of a monetary
wage (which may be fixed or null) and a nonmonetary reward that depends on the
state of nature (i.e. the occurrence of specific events observable by both parties).
Our definition of non-purely monetary incentives hence is rather large: we consider a
general utility function with two arguments, monetary and nonmonetary, explicitly
dependent on the state of nature and thereby allowing for many different notions of
nonpecuniary rewards like a medal, a promotion without a wage increase, a prize
etc.
In an analogous perspective, Auriol and Renault [2] propose a moral hazard
model in which agents receive both wage and non-wage compensations. They in-
troduce directly a status variable in the utility function to reflect an agent’s claim
to social recognition in work. While we also consider preferences defined directly
over monetary and nonmonetary arguments, our model is quite different because
we are able to captures more nonmonetary compensation tools than simply so-
cial status. The first novelty of our approach thus lies in the degree of generality
of the compensation mix offered by the principal which may range from cash to
fringe benefits, hierarchical status, identity (or self-image) or even sanctions (the
nonmonetary part is not restricted to be positive).
Moreover, we use a general utility function such that preferences are not required
a priory to exhibit income-status complementarity. In fact, we analyze the degree
of congruence between monetary and nonmonetary benefits in the optimal compen-
sation policy mix proposed by the principal under different functional forms. The
second novelty of our approach hence consists in deriving the optimal composition
of the compensation policy mix, and illustrating the trade-off between wage and
non-wage benefits in terms of relative complementarity or substitutability.
Finally, our results also depend on whether the principal knows the agent’s “value
system”. Intuitively this means the value of a job to the employee, according to
a set of criteria comprising wage and fringe benefits, social status, symbols. More
generally, this notion of value system could also be associated with the notion of
adhesion to a norm, defined by sociologists as a “general rule of voluntary behav-
ior”(see for instance the discussion by Kreps [19]). Indeed, a particular social norm
can be considered as a particular value system to which the agent adheres. Whether
the employer knows the agent’s value system is a crucial question to design good
management practice. When selecting the mix of reward options proposed to their
employees, the employers’ final judgment should not resemble a guess more than
a well-informed choice. To avoid this, regular surveys and other forms of com-
munication diffuse within firms. For instance, Wood [25] documents three types
of fringe benefits: travel, merchandize or cash programs and indicates that unlike
cash, merchandizes have a high trophy value but are not as exciting as travels. On
a more general level, the trade-off between monetary and nonmonetary benefits de-
pends on the employer’s information about the agent’s value system because purely
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financial incentive schemes can induce significant adverse side effects, and mainly
two: motivation and equity concerns. According to the former -motivational- ef-
fect, money would lower employee motivation by reducing the intrinsic rewards of
a job(see Frey et al. [12]). According to the latter -equity concerns- adverse ef-
fect of financial incentives, horizontal inequity among workers would reduce morale
and productivity. Knowing the agent’s system value hence is crucial to determine
the optimal wage and non-wage compensation policy. Our results are first derived
in the case of full knowledge by the principal, but interestingly they remain valid
under a weaker knowledge structure.
To discuss the optimal composition of the compensation package and the trade-
off between monetary and nonmonetary benefits, our article is composed of five
sections. Section 2 describes preferences and profit functions. Section 3 and 4
derive the main results of our model. Finally, section 6 concludes the article.
2. The Model
2.1. Nonmonetary rewards as symbols.
We consider a Principal-Agent relationship with moral hazard1 in which the
Principal designs the optimal contract by proposing monetary and/or nonmonetary
incentives. We label nonmonetary incentives under the term of symbol. The
notion of symbol allows capturing the fact that nonmonetary benefits may range
from fringe benefits (e.g. pension scheme, health and life insurance, stock options,
free car) to nonmonetary incentives which have a trophy value (like travel) or affect
a person’s image, either her self-image (i.e. identity as this is the case in Akerlof
and Kranton [1]), or her social image (for instance status in the organization as in
Auriol and Renault [2]).
To give examples of various symbols, we can think of receiving a medal (military
or civil like an olympic medal), a promotion (without a significant wage increase),
an academic prize (e.g. Nobel Prize2, Social Choice and Welfare Prize3, Gold Medal
of the French CNRS, etc.), a business award (e.g. being elected the ”Manager of
the year”) or recognition (like a business car, a business flat, a travel, flowers, a
big office etc.) or belonging to a selective club (like Rotary Club), a national sport
team (soccer, rugby etc.), or a professional society (e.g. Econometric Society).
Let Ω be the infinite overall set of all symbols. These symbols that serve as
non-monetary incentives may be divisible as well as indivisible but they are not
immediately liquid for the Agent who receives them. Their role therefore does not
consist in yielding a monetary revenue to the Agent. We have to define costs and
preferences associated with such symbols.
Offering symbols to the agent is not costless for the principal. Let c denote the
cost function for the principal, c : Ω −→ R+where c(ω) is the production cost by
the Principal for the symbol ω.
1The analysis can be extended to any other type of agency relationship (adverse selection,
signalling,...).
2Most researchers would prefer to obtain the Nobel prize even without the monetary reward
associated rather than the pure monetary reward, without the title ”Nobel”.
3No monetary reward is associated to this prize.
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Given a standard preference relation % defined over the set of symbols Ω, let
s = h(ω) denote the symbolic equivalent of ω ∈ Ω in R. h represents the
nonmonetary reward associated with symbol ω and may be interpreted as a self-
satisfaction or “ego”function (the agent prefers ω to ω′ because ω provides more
self-esteem than does ω′). Basically, rather than the set of symbols Ω, we will
therefore use S, a set of real numbers equivalent to these symbols.
Given function h, the cost function defined over the set S is denoted by c˜, where:
c˜ : S −→ R+
s 7−→ c˜(s) = c(h−1(s))
To simplify notations, and when no confusion arises, we will replace the notation
c˜ by c. Note that function c is not necessarily either monotonically increasing or
decreasing but c is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.
Finally, the output of the relationship between the principal and the agent is a
random (observable) variable and we denote by X the set of outputs. The agent’s
reward is composed of a a (standard) monetary wage w : X −→W , and a nonmon-
etary component s : X −→ S where W is the set of monetary wages, W ⊆ R∗+.
2.2. Technology and preferences.
Given the costs and rewards defined previously, we characterize in this section the
principal’s profit, the agent’s utility and effort and the output of the relationship.
The risk-neutral Principal profit function is defined by:
B(x− w − c(s)) = x− w − c(s)
where w denotes the agent’s monetary reward, c(s) is the C 2 cost of the nonmon-
etary reward and x ∈ X is the observable random output.
The Agent is risk-averse, with a utility function defined by:
U˜(w, s, e) = u˜(w, s)− v(e)
where e is the agent’s effort, e ∈ R+; u˜ is a strictly increasing concave utility
function, and v(e) is the agent’s cost of effort: v′(e) > 0 , v′′(e) ≥ 0 , v(0) = 0
We further assume that the agent’s effort level can take two possible values:
e ∈ {eL, eH} with eL < eH , the stochastic production level x can take take n
possible values: x ∈ X = {x1, ..., xn} where x1 < x2 < x3 < ... < xn; and the
stochastic influence of effort in production is defined by the probabilities pHi =
Pr(x = xi|e = eH) > 0 , pLi = Pr(x = xi|e = eL) > 0.
Assumption 1. The probabilities of success satisfy the monotone likelihood
ratio property: p
H
i −pLi
pHi
is nondecreasing in i.
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Two particular cases are worth highlighting. The first one corresponds to the
standard Principal-Agent framework, where the agent’s utility depends on mone-
tary rewards only: U(w, e) = u(w)− v(e), with u′(w) > 0, u′′(w) ≤ 0, u(0) = 0. In
this situation, the Principal solves the following program:
(PMON)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Max
{w(xi)}ni=1
∑n
i=1 p
H
i (xi − w (xi))
s.t.∑n
i=1 p
H
i u(w(xi))− v(eH) ≥ U∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u(w(xi)) ≥ v(eH)− v(eL)
where the first constraint is the participation constraint, the second one is the
incentive compatibility constraint, and U is the Agent’s reservation utility.
The second situation corresponds to a pure nonmonetary incentives scheme
where the agent’s utility would depend on nonmonetary rewards only: G(s, e) =
g(s)− v(e), with g′(s) > 0, g′′(s) ≤ 0. The main difference between u and g is that
g(s) can be negative in the case where s is a negative incentive (sanction). When
there is no monetary wage, the Principal solves the following program :
(PNMO1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Max
{s(xi)}ni=1
∑n
i=1 p
H
i [xi − c (s(xi))]
s.t.∑n
i=1 p
H
i g(s(xi))− v(eH) ≥ U∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
g(s(xi)) ≥ v(eH)− v(eL)
In this situation the program (PNMO1) does not necessarily admit a so-
lution (see appendix). In particular, if the cost function is strictly decreasing then
the program (PNMO1) has no solution. Decreasing symbolic costs are not outliers
per se and we give an example that illustrates it in the following subsection. The
absence of solution in such a case stems from the fact that there is a contradiction
between the profit maximizing objective of the Principal and the participation and
incentive constraints. This property is interesting because it shows that using sym-
bols as incentive devices in agency problems is not trivial even when the costs of
providing symbols are decreasing. To avoid this problem, we therefore assume for
the rest of the paper that:
Assumption 2. c the cost function is a strictly increasing convex function.
2.3. The agent’s value system.
Given that the incentives scheme is composed of a monetary wage and a nonmon-
etary reward, knowing the agent’s value system is crucial to determine the optimal
composition of the compensation package. Wood [25] documents that “The best
salespeople like to wow others with their sales number. And when it comes to
their reward, they have to be wowed... travel does this better than any other in-
centive.”In other words, the more informed the decision, the better the odds of a
successful incentive policy. The knowledge structure for the principal is defined as
follows.
Definition 1. The agent’s value system is represented by the agent’s preference
relation %, captured through function h . Full knowledge by the principal refers to
the case where h is common knowledge to both parties.
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The value that the Agent attributes to a symbol depends on the way this Agent
internalizes and interprets this symbol, that is on her value system (a notion that
could be linked to social or personal norms). The full information (common knowl-
edge) case serves as the benchmark situation, but alternative knowledge structures
will also be analyzed. When the agent’s system value is not common knowledge,
the agent’s preference relation is a private information, it is conditional to his ob-
servation of a random variable θ ∈ Θ. We denote by %θ this preference relation,
and by h(ω, θ) the corresponding real-valued function - symbolic equivalent. Three
subcases can then be distinguished:
Case 1. The Principal does not know (and has no prior on) the probability distri-
bution of θ. In this case, the principal can only resort to pure monetary incentives.
Case 2. The Principal knows the probability distribution of θ. In this case, a mixed
monetary/nonmonetary incentives mechanism can be designed by working on the
expected self-satisfaction of a symbol ω denoted ĥ (ω) = ŝ = EΘ [h(ω, θ)].
Case 3. The Principal does not know (and has no prior on) the probability distri-
bution of θ but she knows that there exist (at least) two symbols ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such
that ω′  ω′′. This is the case we will analyze more specifically in section 5.
3. Optimal compensation under complete information
In this section we characterize the optimal compensation scheme when the agent’s
value system is common knowledge to both parties. In modern firms or organiza-
tions, the agent cannot be paid only with symbols and a monetary reward is included
in the contract. Let us therefore consider a mixed incentives scheme composed of
a monetary and a nonmonetary reward, in which the Principal solves the following
program :
(PMIX)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Max
{w(xi),s(xi)}ni=1
∑n
i=1 p
H
i [xi − w(xi)− c (s(xi))]
s.t.∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s(xi))− v(eH) ≥ U∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s(xi)) ≥ v(eH)− v(eL)
The optimal compensation policy that solves program (PMIX) is characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the agent’s value system is common knowledge, then the optimal
solution of (PMIX), {w∗(xi), s∗ (xi)}ni=1, is such that
u˜′s(w
∗(xi), s∗(xi))
u˜′w(w∗(xi), s∗(xi))
= c′(s∗(xi)), ∀ xi ∈ X.
and therefore exhibits stronger wage/symbol substitutability for low wage levels, and
higher wage/symbol congruence at high wage levels.
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The fact that the optimal compensation policy depends on the degree of sub-
stitutability between monetary and nonmonetary rewards relies on the fact thateu′s(.,.)eu′w(.,.) measures the marginal rate of substitution between symbol and wage. This
property is based on the concavity of the utility function. Basically, in the plane
(w(xi), s(xi)), a convex indifference curve exhibits diminishing marginal rate of
substitution between w(xi) and s(xi),
eu′w(.,.)eu′s(.,.) , and increasing marginal rate of sub-
stitution between s(xi) and w(xi),
eu′s(.,.)eu′w(.,.) . Put differently, when the agent has a
higher monetary wage, she is willing to give up more monetary wage in exchange of
obtaining equal amounts of nonmonetary symbols. In other words, substitutability
between wage and symbol is lower for lower wage levels.
This property holds for standard utility functions and it is interesting to con-
sider the case where u˜ is a CES fonction: u˜(w(xi), s(xi)) = [w(xi)−ε + s(xi)−ε]
− vε
with ε ≥ −1. Then the optimality condition derived from proposition 1 writes:(
w∗(xi)
s∗(xi)
)ε+1
= c′(s∗(xi)), that is:
w∗(xi)
s∗(xi)
= [c′(s∗(xi))]
1
ε+1 . We see that w
∗(xi)
s∗(xi)
is
a decreasing function of ε, where the elasticity of substitution between w(xi) and
s(xi) is σ = 11+ε . As ε increases, s and w become less and less substitutable. In the
limit case ε = +∞, s and w are complementary, and given the optimality condition
w∗(xi)
s∗(xi)
= [c′(s∗(xi))]
1
ε+1 then w∗(xi) = s∗(xi). When ε decreases, s and w become
more substitutable and w/s increases.
In other words, the degree of substitutability between both rewards shapes the
use of cash or fringe benefits as relative complements or substitutes in the optimal
composition of the compensation package. There is some empirical evidence in
line with this issue. Dale-Olsen [5] shows that for non-public sector establishments
offering fringe benefits in Norway in 2002, there seems to exist a positive corre-
lation between wages and fringe benefits. However, when accounting for the size
of the establishments then Norwegian manufacturing is actually characterized by
a convex relationship between fringe benefits and workforce size to the position in
the conditional wage distribution. This convex relationship means that high wage
establishments offer more fringes to their employees and have a higher size, but
very low wage establishments also offer more fringes and are large. These facts are
not inconsistent with our assessment that substitutability is lower for lower wage
levels.
Let us now consider the following program:
(PMIX2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Max
{s(xi)}ni=1
∑n
i=1 p
H
i [xi − c (s(xi))]− w¯
s.t.∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w¯, s(xi))− v(eH) ≥ U∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w¯, s(xi)) ≥ v(eH)− v(eL)
where w¯ ≥ IΛ , IΛ being the certainty equivalent of lottery
Λ =
(
pH1 , w
∗(x1); . . . ; pHn , w
∗(xn)
)
Comparing programs (PMIX2) and (PMON) yields the following proposition.
THE COMPOSITION OF COMPENSATION POLICY: FROM CASH TO FRINGE BENEFITS 9
Proposition 2. If the principal knows the agent’s value system, the optimal mech-
anism which solves program (PMIX2), {w¯, s∗ (xi)}ni=1, where s∗(xi) is defined by:
u˜′s(w¯, s
∗(xi))
c′(s∗(xi))
=
1
λ3 + µ3
(
1− pLi
pHi
)
with λ3, µ3, the strictly positive Lagrange multipliers of (PMIX2), is such that the
agent:
• faces a lower risk exposure in terms of monetary wage, compared to the
case of pure monetary incentives mechanism
• is indifferent between the contract with mixed compensations (PMIX2) and
the contract with purely monetary incentives (PMON).
Proposition 2 states that the Principal can use nonmonetary incentives in or-
der to reduce the agent’s risk exposure in terms of monetary reward because the
agent is indifferent between the pure monetary contract (PMON) and a mixed con-
tract (PMIX2), where the monetary reward is equal or higher than the certainty
equivalent of the pure monetary ”lottery” Λ =
(
pH1 , w
∗(x1); . . . ; pHn , w
∗(xn)
)
where:
w∗(xi) = u′−1
 1
λ+ µ
(
1− pLi
pHi
)

with λ and µ are strictly positive Lagrange multipliers.
We are now going to examine the optimal composition of the compensation pol-
icy, that is the relative importance between the symbolic and the monetary reward,
when the agent’s system value is common knowledge. Section 5 will then relax
this assumption and characterize the optimal contract under imperfect knowledge
regarding the agent’s system value.
4. Optimal composition of the compensation policy: the trade-off
between monetary and mixed incentives
At first glance, one might think that when the Principal has more instruments
when she uses a mixed monetary/nonmonetary incentives mechanism, then the
latter will automatically increases her profit. Nevertheless, this statement is not
true. Indeed, if the principal can use more incentives instruments in the mixed
monetary/nonmonetary incentives mechanism, she also faces more costs. If, for
instance c (s(xi)) = w(xi) whatever xi ∈ X, then a mixed monetary/non-monetary
incentives mechanism will reduce the principal’s profit compared to the purely
monetary incentives mechanism. Therefore the issue of the optimal composition of
the compensation policy is not trivial.
Let Π∗MON the Principal’s optimal profit in the program (PMON) and Π
∗
MIX
the Principal’s optimal profit in the program (PMIX). We will show that if the
Principal knows the Agent’s value system, then under the weak condition set in
assumption 3 we have Π∗MON < Π
∗
MIX .
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Let φ(x|e) be the conditional distribution and ϕ(x|e) be the everywhere positive
density function.
Assumption 3. Let {s(x)} be a sequence of non-monetary incentives, then :
E(s) =
∫
X
s(x)ϕ(x|e¯)dx > E(c(s)) =
∫
X
c(s(x))ϕ(x|e¯)dx
where e¯ which is the effort’s level required by the Principal.
Let us note that if the Principal knows the Agent’s preferences then assumption
3 is not too much constraining because the set of non-monetary incentives is suf-
ficiently large. The trade-off between monetary and mixed incentives packages is
characterized as follows.
Theorem 1. When the Principal knows the Agent’s value system then : if there
exists an optimal pure monetary incentives scheme {w∗ (xi)}ni=1 which solves the
program (PMON), then there exists an optimal mixed monetary / nonmonetary
incentives scheme {w∗mix (xi) , s∗ (xi)}ni=1 solution of the program (PMIX) which
guarantees to the Principal an expected profit strictly higher:
Π∗MIX > Π
∗
MON
and which guarantees the same expected utility to the Agent:
n∑
i=1
pHi u˜(w
∗
mix(xi), s
∗(xi))− v(eH) =
n∑
i=1
pHi u(w
∗(xi))− v(eH)
This result indicates that if the Principal knows the Agent’s preferences over the
set of symbols Ω then all what a pure monetary incentives scheme can provide, a
mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme can provide it as well: a mixed
monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme Pareto-dominates a purely monetary
incentives scheme.
Corollary 1. When the Principal knows the Agent’s value system then: if there
exists an optimal pure monetary incentives scheme {w∗ (xi)}ni=1 which solves the
program (PMON) then there exists a (non optimal) mixed monetary/ nonmonetary
incentives scheme {wmix (xi) , s (xi)}ni=1 which provides an expected profit to the
Principal ΠMIX such that:
Π∗MIX > ΠMIX ≥ Π∗MON
and which guarantees to the Agent a higher expected utility:
n∑
i=1
pHi u˜(wmix(xi), s(xi))− v(eH) >
n∑
i=1
pHi u(w
∗(xi))− v(eH)
This Corollary states that if the Principal is ready to accept a profit ΠMIX
strictly lower than Π∗MIX (but still greater than Π
∗
MON ) , then there exists a mixed
monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme which Pareto-dominates strictly the
solution given by a pure monetary incentives scheme.
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We are now going to examine the case where the agent’s value system is not
common knowledge.
5. The agent’s value system is not common knowledge
When the agent’s system value is not common knowledge, then the agent’s pref-
erence is conditional to his observation of a random variable θ ∈ Θ : %θ. Three
situations may arise then:
• when the principal does not know (and has no prior on) the probability
distribution of θ, only a standard purely monetary incentives mechanism
can be proposed to the agent.
• when the principal knows the probability distribution of θ, a mixed mon-
etary/nonmonetary incentives mechanism can be designed using the ex-
pected self-satisfaction of a symbol ω, ĥ (ω) = ŝ = EΘ [h(ω, θ)].
However it seems reasonable to consider that in most empirical problems,
we are only in the following third case.
• the principal does not know (and has no prior on) the probability distribu-
tion of θ, but knows that there exist (at least) two symbols ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such
that ω′  ω′′.
In this intermediate case, the principal knows that there exists a symbol ω′ which
is not strictly dominated by any other symbol. Hence, the Principal can use this
symbol when designing the optimal composition of the incentives scheme. In turn,
let us now consider the following program:
(PMIX3)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Max
{w(xi)}ni=1
∑n
i=1 p
H
i [xi − w(xi)]− s′
s.t.∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s
′)− v(eH) ≥ U∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s′) ≥ v(eH)− v(eL)
where s′ is the non-monetary reward associated with symbol ω′.
Since the principal uses only one symbol, then assumption 3 writes: s′ > c(s′).
The optimal compensation package is then characterized by the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3. When the Principal does not know (and has no prior) the probabil-
ity distribution of θ but knows that there exist (at least) two symbols ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such
that ω′  ω′′, then the optimal incentive mechanism derived from program (PMIX3)
{w∗ (xi) , s′}ni=1 where s′ is the non-monetary reward associated with symbol ω′, and
w∗(xi) the monetary component is defined by :
u˜′w(w
∗(xi), s′) =
1
λ4 + µ4
(
1− pLi
pHi
)
with λ4, µ4, the strictly positive Lagrange multipliers. This compensation package,
solution of program (PMIX3), always Pareto-dominates purely monetary incentives,
solution of program (PMON).
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This proposition shows that even when the principal imperfectly knows the
agent’s value system, a mixed (non purely) monetary incentives scheme still ex-
ists. The agent is ex ante indifferent between a monetary and a non-pure monetary
incentives mechanisms because in both case she obtains exactly the same reser-
vation utility. Moreover, a mixed (monetary/nonmonetary) incentives mechanism
increases the principal’s profit. This proposition is important for empirical purpose
since in most firms and organizations, many fringe benefits are not conditioned to
the firm’s result. This is the case for instance of health insurance, nursery, or free
car. The proposition leads to the following prediction : using a fixed fringe benefit
and a variable salary as an incentive device actually improves the Principal’s profit.
Actually, it seem that one should distinguish among nonmonetary incentives be-
tween fixed fringe benefits offered by the principal for instance to retain employees
and reduce turnover (see Dale-Olsen [5]), and symbols with a high trophy value (for
instance like status in the organization) for which the principal could have more
knowledge in terms of the agent’s system value and could be profitably linked to
the firm’s results.
6. Conclusion
This article shows that a mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme may
be more efficient than a standard monetary scheme and that an imperfect knowledge
of the agent’s preferences influences the optimal composition of the compensation
policy in favor of fixed fringe benefits and variable wages.
From an economic policy perspective, taking into account the tax system 4 might
reinforce our results in the following sense. A mixed monetary/non-monetary in-
centives scheme would be more interesting both for the principal and for the agent
under a progressive tax system for the lower part of the income distribution subject
to a traditional threshold level. Indeed, for such categories of workers, a monetary
bonus may sometimes be completely suboptimal when it implies that the agent
switches up to the higher income category, making her pay taxes and losing social
transfers. For the principal as well, if labor taxes are progressive, a non-purely mon-
etary incentives scheme represents a non-negligible fiscal advantage, even though we
have seen that the role of cost in the optimal compensation package is not trivial.
While this paper does not provide per se a novel formalization of intrinsic versus
extrinsic motivations, our results can shed a new light on this debate. Frey et al.
[12] define intrinsic motivation as “activities one simply undertakes because one
likes to do them or because the individual derives some satisfaction from doing his
or her duty”. Purely monetary incentives induce hidden costs for the principal, as
shown formally within agency contexts by Lane [20], and Benabou and Tirole [3]
among others. Since we show that mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives are
more profitable than purely monetary ones, our approach supports the idea that
nonmonetary compensations also offset the “hidden costs of rewards ”.
4A formal analysis of the incidence of non-monetary incentives within a macroeconomic frame-
work with a third party - the government - and a specific tax policy is outside the scope of this
paper.
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Among the main factors that contribute to raise intrinsic motivation, incentives
schemes which are not perceived by the agent as designed to monitor her behavior
but rather designed to reward ex post the effort level (thereby being discretionary)
and more generally, incentives schemes which send a positive signal to the agent
regarding her “self-determination ”positively affect intrinsic motivation. In turn,
our model can be interpreted as one in which a mixed monetary/non-monetary in-
centives scheme increases intrinsic motivation on the basis of these factors. Indeed,
let us consider the mixed compensation policy {w∗, s (xi)}ni=1 where w∗ is fixed.
This incentives scheme will not be perceived by the agent as designed to monitor
her behavior because the monetary component w∗ is the same whatever the result
xi. The non-monetary symbol associated ω (xi) varies with the results but it is not
a monetary wage. The agent will perceive it as an ex post reward for the effort
provided. If for instance X = {x1, x2} with ω (x1) = “scooter” , ω (x2) = “car”
, w0 = 3000USD/month and if x = x2 occurs; the agent will consider the car
given by the Principal as a discretionary reward aimed at rewarding her effort. It
is both a prize (since it rewards an effort) and a gift from the Principal (since it
shows that her work is publicly recognized). And this is the case all the more as,
according to our results, the principal can build the monetary system in such a
way that the agent obtains an expected utility strictly higher than under a mon-
etary incentive scheme. Besides, since a symbol is perceived by the agent as a
discretionary reward, then the agent will behave more in favor of the organization.
Indeed, according to Fehr and Gachter [10], and Akerlof and Kranton [1], a gift
(from the principal) induces reciprocity (from the agent), and hence increases the
agent’s intrinsic motivation.
Finally, let remind that the agent’s utility is given by : U˜(w, s, e) = u˜(w, s)−v(e)
where s = h(ω) is the non-monetary wage obtained by the agent from symbol ω and
can be interpreted as an index of “ego” or self-satisfaction, whereby nonmonetary
rewards offset the motivation crowding-out effect of price incentives.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof : (PNMO1) does not necessarily admit a solution. We can solve the program
(PNMO1) using Kuhn and Tucker method because on the one part the cost func-
tion is twice continuously differentiable and on the other part
∑n
i=1 p
H
i g(s(xi)) and∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
g(s(xi)) are concave functions. However the solution if it exists
is a local maximum. Let L (s(x1), . . . , s(xn), λ1, µ1) the Lagrangean of program
(PNMO1) with λ1, µ1 ≥ 0. Kuhn and Tucker’s conditions are given as follows:
(6.1)
(a) −pHi c′(s(xi)) + λ1pHi g′(s(xi)) + µ1
(
pHi − pLi
)
g′(s(xi)) = 0
(b) λ1
[∑n
i=1 p
H
i g(s(xi))− v(eH)− U
]
= 0
(c) µ1
[∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
g(s(xi))− v(eH) + v(eL)
]
= 0
Equation (a) also writes :
(6.2) λ1pHi + µ1
(
pHi − pLi
)
= pHi .
c′(s(xi))
g′(s(xi))
Hence we have:
λ1 =
∑
i
pHi .
c′(s(xi))
g′(s(xi))
Recall however that while g′(s(xi)) > 0, we have made no assumption about the
monotony of cost function c. If this function is strictly decreasing then
∑
i
pHi .
c′(s(xi))
g′(s(xi))
<
0 and we have a contradiction with. λ1 ≥ 0. Therefore if the cost function is strictly
decreasing then program (PNMO1) admits no solution. We have the same conclu-
sion if c is not monotone decreasing but is such that
∑
i
pHi .
c′(s(xi))
g′(s(xi))
< 0. 
Proof of proposition 1. We can solve the program (PMIX) using Kuhn and Tucker
method because on the one part the cost function is a convex function and on the
other part
∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s(xi)) and
∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s(xi)) are negative
semidefinite functions. Moreover the solution if it exists is a global maximum. Let
L (w(x1), . . . , w(xn); s(x1), . . . , s(xn), λ2, µ2) the Lagrangean of program (PMIX)
with λ2, µ2 ≥ 0. Kuhn and Tucker’s conditions are given as follows:
(a) −pHi + λ2pHi u˜′w(w(xi), s(xi)) + µ2
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜′w(w(xi), s(xi)) = 0
(b) −pHi c′(s(xi)) + λ2pHi u˜′s(w(xi), s(xi)) + µ2
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜′s(w(xi), s(xi)) = 0
(c) λ2
[∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s(xi))− v(eH)− U
]
= 0
(d) µ2
[∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s(xi))− v(eH) + v(eL)
]
= 0
(a) writes also:
(6.3) λ2pHi + µ2
(
pHi − pLi
)
=
pHi
u˜′w(w(xi), s(xi))
Hence :
λ2 =
∑
i
pHi
u˜′w(w(xi), s(xi))
THE COMPOSITION OF COMPENSATION POLICY: FROM CASH TO FRINGE BENEFITS15
Since u˜′w(w(xi), s(xi)) > 0 then λ2 > 0 (we reach exactly the same conclusion using
Kuhn and Tucker condition (b)). Concerning µ2 , if µ2 = 0 then (a) and (b) implies
respectively that:
λ2 =
1
u˜′w(w(xi), s(xi))
and
λ2 =
c′(s(xi))
u˜′s(w(xi), s(xi))
λ2 = 1u˜′w(w(xi),s(xi)) implies that (using implicit functions theorem) w(xi) = φ (λ2, s(xi)).
Therefore, λ2 =
c′(s(xi))
u˜′s(w(xi),s(xi))
also writes:
λ2 =
c′(s(xi))
u˜′s [φ (λ2, s(xi)) , s(xi)]
Let us denote c
′(s(xi))
u˜′s[φ(λ2,s(xi)),s(xi)]
by ψ(s(xi)) then the previous equation becomes :
λ2 = ψ(s(xi))
That is :
s(xi) = ψ−1(λ2)
In other words, the Agent receives the same symbol whatever the result. In this
case, the Agent will choose the lowest effort level eL. Therefore, such a mechanism
is not optimal. Hence we have µ2 > 0. The optimal mixed monetary/non-monetary
incentives scheme is given by :
{w∗(xi), s∗ (xi)}ni=1
such thateu′s(w∗(xi),s∗(xi))eu′w(w∗(xi),s∗(xi)) = c′(s∗(xi)), ∀ xi ∈ X.

Proof of proposition 2. We can solve the program (PMIX2) using Kuhn and Tucker
method because on the one part the cost function is a convex function and on the
other part
∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w¯, s(xi)) and
∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w¯, s(xi)) are concave in s.
Hence the solution if it exists is a global maximum. Let L (w¯; s(x1), . . . , s(xn), λ3, µ3)
the Lagrangean of program (PMIX2) with λ3, µ3 ≥ 0. Kuhn and Tucker’s condi-
tions are given as follows:
(a) −pHi c′(s(xi)) + λ3pHi u˜′s(w¯, s(xi)) + µ3
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜′s(w¯, s(xi)) = 0
(b) λ3
[∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w¯, s(xi))− v(eH)− U
]
= 0
(c) µ3
[∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w¯, s(xi))− v(eH) + v(eL)
]
= 0
(a) writes also:
(6.4) λ3pHi + µ3
(
pHi − pLi
)
= pHi .
c′(s(xi))
u˜′s(w¯, s(xi))
Hence :
λ3 =
∑
i
pHi .
c′(s(xi))
u˜′s(w¯, s(xi))
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Since u˜′s(w¯, s(xi)) and c
′(s(xi)) are strictly positive then λ3 > 0. Concerning µ3 ,
if µ3 = 0 then (a) implies that:
λ3 =
c′(s(xi))
u˜′s(w¯, s(xi))
= ψ(s(xi))
That is :
s(xi) = ψ−1(λ3)
In other words, the Agent receives the same symbol whatever the result. In this
case, the Agent will choose the lowest effort level eL. Therefore, such a mechanism
is not optimal. Hence we have µ3 > 0. The optimal incentives scheme is given by :
{w¯, s∗ (xi)}ni=1
such thateu′s(w¯,s∗(xi))
c′(s∗(xi))
= 1
λ3+µ3

1− p
L
i
pH
i
 , ∀ xi ∈ X.
The Agent is indifferent between the solution of (PMIX2) and the one of (PMON)
because in both case he gets his reservation utility. However his risk exposure
concerning his monetary wage is reduced since he is risk-averse in w and he gets
w ≥ IΛ the certainty equivalent of Λ =
(
pH1 , w
∗(x1); . . . ; pHn , w
∗(xn)
)
, the lottery
faced by the Agent in the pure monetary incentives mechanism. 
Proof of proposition 3. We can solve the program (PMIX3) using Kuhn and Tucker
method because on the one part the cost function is a convex function and on the
other part
∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s
′) and
∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s′) are concave in w.
Hence the solution if it exists is a global maximum. Let L (w(x1), . . . , w(xn); s′;λ4, µ4)
the Lagrangean of program (PMIX3) with λ4, µ4 ≥ 0. Kuhn and Tucker’s condi-
tions are given as follows:
(a) −pHi + λ4pHi u˜′w(w(xi), s′) + µ4
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜′w(w(xi), s
′) = 0
(b) λ4
[∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s
′)− v(eH)− U] = 0
(c) µ4
[∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s′)− v(eH) + v(eL)
]
= 0
(a) writes also:
(6.5) λ4pHi + µ4
(
pHi − pLi
)
=
pHi
u˜′w(w(xi), s′)
Hence :
λ4 =
∑
i
pHi
u˜′w(w(xi), s′)
Since u˜′w(w(xi), s
′) is strictly positive then λ4 > 0. Applying the same reasoning as
in the previous proof we have µ4 > 0. The optimal incentives scheme is given by :
{w∗ (xi) , s′}ni=1
such that
u˜′w(w
∗(xi), s′) = 1
λ4+µ4

1− p
L
i
pH
i
 , ∀ xi ∈ X.

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Lemma 1. Let denote by q : the following random variable
q = w∗ (x)− c(s∗(x))− w∗mix (x)
q denotes the difference between the optimal wage of the monetary incentives scheme
w∗ (x) and the overall cost of the mixed monetary/non-monetary incentives scheme.
The following two conditions are equivalent.
(1) Π∗MIX ≥ Π∗MON
(2) E [q] ≥ 0
Proof of lemma 1.
Π∗MON =
n∑
i=1
pHi (xi − w∗ (xi))
Π∗MIX =
n∑
i=1
pHi [xi − c(s∗(xi))− w∗mix (xi)]
Thus :
Π∗MIX ≥ Π∗MON ⇔
n∑
i=1
pHi [w
∗ (xi)− c(s∗(xi))− w∗mix (xi)] ≥ 0
That is :
E [q] ≥ 0

Proof of theorem 1. The proof consists in showing that E [q] > 0. Using lemma 1,
this amounts to show that :
Π∗MIX > Π
∗
MON .
Let :
C =
{
({w(xi)}ni=1 , {s(xi)}ni=1) :
∑n
i=1 p
H
i u˜(w(xi), s(xi))− v(eH) = U
and
∑n
i=1
(
pHi − pLi
)
u˜(w(xi), s(xi)) = v(eH)− v(eL)
}
Clearly, the optimal solution of program (PMIX) is such that {w∗ (xi) , s∗ (xi)}ni=1 ∈
C. The set C also writes :
C =
{
({w(xi)}ni=1 , {s(xi)}ni=1) :
n∑
i=1
pLi u˜(w(xi), s(xi)) = U + v(e
L)
}
Now let take {w∗(xi)}ni=1 the optimal solution of program (PMON). Let determine
({w¯(xi)}ni=1 , {s¯(xi)}ni=1) ∈ C such that :
(6.6) w∗ (xi) = w¯(xi) + s¯(xi) , i = 1...n
Such a ({w¯(xi)}ni=1 , {s¯(xi)}ni=1) necessarily exists according to Borsuk’s theorem
on nonlinear equations system. But, by assumption 3:
n∑
i=1
pHi s¯(xi) >
n∑
i=1
pHi c(s¯(xi)) , ∀ i = 1...n
We finally get :
n∑
i=1
pHi (xi − w∗ (xi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π∗MON
<
n∑
i=1
pHi [xi − w¯(xi)− c(s¯(xi))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΠMIX
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Let recall that the optimal solution of program (PMIX), {w∗ (xi) , s∗ (xi)}ni=1 ∈ C.
But by definition we have : Π∗MIX ≥ ΠMIX . Hence :
Π∗MIX > Π
∗
MON .
It remains to show that :
n∑
i=1
pHi u˜(w
∗
mix(xi), s
∗(xi))− v(eH) =
n∑
i=1
pHi u(w
∗(xi))− v(eH)
This comes directly from the fact that the agent has the same reservation utility
under (PMIX) and (PMON). 
Proof of Corollary 1. We know that
Π∗MIX > Π
∗
MON .
If we take for example 0 < ε < Π∗MIX− Π∗MON , and if we build another non-purely
monetary incentive scheme with :
w(xi) = w∗mix(xi) + ε
s(xi) = s∗(xi) , ∀ i = 1...n
then we get our result. 
Proof of proposition ??. This result is the equivalent of theorem 1 when the Prin-
cipal does not know (and has no prior) the probability distribution of θ but knows
that there exist (at least) two symbols ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that ω′  ω′′. We can
therefore use the same technology of proof. 
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